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state constitutions. After the war with Great Britain, many state tri-
bunals recognized the liberty, some to the extent of applying it to
witnesses and to parties in civil disputes. By 1789 there was a viable
corpus of state law and custom endorsing the right, and it was
therefore somewhat natural for James Madison to include it in his
draft of the fifth amendment. Although Levy admits that there is
virtually no evidence concerning legislative intent, he does speculate
from the language itself that the amendment was designed to be broad
in scope and mandatory in application.
Levy's book, although excellent, is not without its weaknesses. The
author devotes too much space to the procedural controversies of
ecclesiastical tribunals and too little to the status of the common law
on the subject of involuntary testimony. Indeed, he hardly broaches
the latter topic until midway in his book, although it would seem to
be more central to his thesis. In addition, he writes excessively about
the religious controversies themselves although they serve only as
background to the legal questions involved. In contrast, Levy conveys
an impression of hastiness in his treatment of the colonial response to
English precedent. Granted the sources are thin, but so, sometimes, is
Levy's discussion of them. Finally, the author seems unduly Whiggish
in his summary remarks on the supposed dedication of the founding
fathers to the right against self-incrimination. That the revolutionary
and constitutional patriarchs were so devoted does not seem to follow
from Levy's preceding discussion; indeed the early legalists of
America seem to have been somewhat uncommitted to many of the
fundatmental elements of what modernists would call "due process.
Despite these errors of emphasis and exaggeration, Levy has given
us a brilliant piece of scholarship on a much-neglected subject.
Robert M. Ireland
Assistant Professor of History
University of Kentucky
A ComMnENTARY ON THm CONSTT=uTON OF THE UNrIED STATES; PnAT III:
RiGHTs OF THE PERsON. 2 vols. By Bernard Schwartz. New York:
Macmillan, 1968. Pp. 1018. $25.00.
Rights of the Person comprises, in two volumes, the third and
concluding part of a comprehensive commentary on the United States
Constitution.1 Part I (two volumes) dealt with the powers of govern-
1 Its publisher styles it "the most comprehensive commentary on the Con-
stitution yet to appear."
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ment; Part II (one volume) treated the rights of property.
Volume I, Sanctity, Privacy, and Expression deals with criminal
justice, the right of privacy, and the freedoms of speech, press, as-
sembly, and association. Volume II, Equality, Belief, and Dignity con-
siders equality, freedom of religion (and freedom from the establish-
ment of religion), and dignity of the person.
Each volume contains three chapters, each ranging from 60 to 175
pages. Arrangement of subject matter, in general, is traditional;
chapters are logically arranged and section headings are clear enough
(except for the use of "same" instead of full sectional titles) to allow
ready reference use.
Footnotes appear at the end of each volume and a table of cases
and index are at the end of Volume II. This placement of footnotes
makes reference to them difficult, reduces the understanding of the
analysis, and proves continuously irritating to the reader. The
table of cases is comprehensive, listing cases cited both in the text and
in footnotes. The date of each case is given, as is a single citation of
source. For Supreme Court cases, citation is to the United States Re-
ports. Parallel citations to the Lawyers' Edition and to the Supreme
Court Reporter would render Professor Schwartz's2 treatises more
useful, though at the cost of considerable effort. The index (17 pages)
is good, but insufficiently detailed-a circumstance mitigated in part
by the logical organization of chapters and of sections, by the compre-
hensiveness of section titles, and by the excellence of the table of cases.
Considered as a whole, by one who has read it all, Schwartz's com-
mentary, Rights of the Person, seems to be an exceptionally compre-
hensive, well organized, scholarly, and lucid treatise on constitutional
liberties. Except for one chapter-the last-the subject matter of indi-
vidual chapters is logically related, the outline carefully structured, and
the treatment free of irrelevancies. Chapter 20, entitled "Dignity of Per-
son," however, covers a considerable range: citizenship and immigra-
tion; treason and comparable crimes; privileges and immunities of
national and state citizenship; freedom of movement; political rights,
such as assembly, petition, voting, and candidacy for office; slavery
and involuntary servitude; freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ments and from self-incrimination; unlawful detention; and "dignity in
the welfare state." There is no unifying theme in this chapter.
Certainly, the phrase "Dignity of Person" does not convey the contents
of this subdivision.
2 Schwartz is Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law at New York University.
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This is not the case in the instances of Chapter 16, "Privacy of the
Person"; 17, "Expression of the Person"; 18, "Equality of Person"; or
19, "Belief of Person", although the apparent desire for similarity of
chapter titles leads the author to the ambiguous heading "Sancity of
Person" for Chapter 15, which, basically, deals with criminal justice.
Why the discussion of coerced confessions, treason and "comparable
crimes," and constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishments and against self-incrimination was not included in
Chapter 15 is difficult to understand. Likewise, the treatment of free-
dom of person and of citizenship, statelessness, and alienage seems
so basic to individual liberties that it ought to come first, rather than
near the end of a commentary on the rights of the person. The dis-
cussion of "poltical rights" (assembly and petition, the suffrage,
candidacy for office, and freedom from discriminations based upon
color, literacy, previous condition of servitude, property, race, sex,
and/or taxpaying) might, perhaps, best stand alone as a separate
chapter. Freedom of movement poses obvious problems when con-
sidered as a constitutional right. In its domestic aspects at least, it
belongs with the discussion of privileges and immunities of citizens
or with the material on the interstate commerce power. In the
sense of travel abroad, it might appropriately be considered with the
implications of due process of law, the war powers, and the foreign
relations power.
Considered as A Commentary on the Constitution of the United
States (its main title), rather than as an exposition of the principles
governing constitutional Rights of Person (the title of this part), Pro-
fessor Schwartz's work has a number of theses (or biases, if you will).
Schwartz states some of these explicitly and early; others are implicit
(or, on occasion, explicit) throughout the work. The dominant theme
of the first two volumes (dealing with the powers of government), he
tells us, was that of a Constitution "construed to endow government
with all the necessary authority to fulfill the great ends set forth in the
Preamble."3 The emphasis of Volume III (dealing with the rights of
property) was "the fundamental change that has more and more con-
ceived property in terms of social function, rather than private right."4
Rights of the Person finds its "main theme" in a "necessary" and
"direct consequence of those in the prior parts:"5
With the Powers of Government so expanded and the Rights of Property
so constricted, it has been necessary for the law to place increasing






stress upon Rights of the Person, by way of compensation. Personal
rights have had to be given countervailing scope, if the ultimate social
interest-that of individual life-was not to be lost sight of. The Bill of
Rights has had to be given ever greater effect as the Great Charter of
personal liberties and has become the very stuff of contemporary consti-
tutional law.6
Stated somewhat more explicitly, the thesis of Rights of Person is
that there is a direct correlation between a concern, on the part of the
courts, for personal rights and the deterioration in the status of
property rights. Schwartz states his hypothesis thus:
If both property and person were to be placed virtually beyond the
pale of constitutional protection, it would strip the individual of the very
attributes of individuality for the furtherance of which the society itself
was constituted. More than that, it would leave him helpless in an age
in which the individual is, at best, in danger of being overwhelmed by
concentrations of power....
* 0 0 *
To express it another way, it may scarcely be doubted that society has
by now fairly got the better of individuality. With the rights of property
so severely compressed, emphasis must be placed on maintaining the
rights of the person, if man is to be able to keep even a modicum of
liberty.j
In the treatment of specific constitutional concepts, Schwartz's ap-
proval (or disapproval) of existing interpretations and tendencies is
often apparent. Thus, he writes of '"Expression and the First Amend-
ment:"
The words of the First Amendment cannot be given absolute
effect in law which they have in language. ['Congress shall make no
law. . .I .... The First Amendment freedoms are not ends in them-
selves, but only means to the end.... their exercise must be compatible
with the preservation of other rights essential in a democracy and
guaranteed by the Constitution. The application in practice of the First
Amendment can no more be governed by absolute rules than can that
of other organic provisions. The demands of First Amendment freedoms,
as well as the competing claims of governmental authority to secure
other recognized interests are 'better served by candid and informed
weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-
Euclidian problems to be solved.'S
Although, the freedom of expression clause of the first amendment
should be interpreted in light of its "historical" and "logical" mean-
ing(s), and not in a "literal vacuum,"9 the same is not true of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which should
0 d.
7 Id. at 4-5.
8 Id. at 262.
9 Id. at 261.
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be read literally. Here, Schwartz argues, the language of the amend-
ment is controlling:
What is important in this respect is, not the possibly restricted intent
of the contemporary Congressional leaders, but the language which they
wrote into the Constitution. What was, after all, submitted for ratification
was such language and not the subjective designs of particular pro-
ponents of the Fourteenth Amendment. And the language of the Amend-
ment plainly states that the guarantee of equality contained in it is to
apply 'to any person: Unless words are to be deprived of their ordinary
meanings, this must include every natural human being within the
jurisdiction of any state-irrespective of citizenship, sex, or race.10
Why the words of the first amendment are to be "deprived of their
ordinary meaning" and those of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth are not to be is nowhere explained, unless it be in the
sentence: "Such . . . is, in fact, the presently accepted scope of the
Equal Protection Clause.""
In interpreting first amendment freedoms, if one follows Schwartz's
argument, "it should be evident to one of discernment in law that the
absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment carries within it its
own reductio ad absurdum" 12 or, alternatively, "it has been clear, from
the beginning of our history, that the Constitution does not provide
for a wholly unfettered right of expression."13 Yet, no such "logical"
or "historical standards" apply (at least not any more) in the case of
equal protection; here the "express wording" and "presently ac-
cepted scope" are controlling. Clearly, one can have it both ways in
constitutional interpretation: a "literal interpretation" of equal pro-
tection, a "balancing test" for first amendment freedoms.
Yet, for all that has been said about Schwartz's tendency to serve
up constitutional law with philosophy, Rights of the Person is an
immensely useful, informative and intelligent work. In sheer number
of cases discussed, it is a monumental treatise. The quality of case
summaries is, unfortunately, uneven. On the other hand, what single,
human intellect could have digested equally well all of this immense
mass of legal materials?
Inevitably, certain topics are treated inadequately. One would
wish, for example, for an analysis of the competing principles at issue
in Feiner v. New York' 4 and in Terminiello v. Chicago.15 The state-
10 ScHwAR'Tz, Vol. II at 492.
11 Id. at 492-93.
12 Sc ¢WARTz, Vol. I at 261.
13 Id.
14 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
15337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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ment (contained in a footnote) "it is paradoxical that Feiner's con-
viction was thus upheld while that at issue in Terminiello v. Chicago,
837 U.S. 1 (1949), where there was a clear breach of the peace, was
upset on technical grounds, is, at best, only moderately informative.
Similarily, it is difficult to understand the omission of Newberry v.
United States1' from the discussion of the power of Congress to
regulate primary elections;' 8 yet Newberry is discussed in neither
text nor footnotes. 19 Other significant cases omitted include: Aguilar
v. Texas,20 dealing with constitutional requirements for obtaining a
state search warrant; Alcorta v. Texas,21 treating the application of due
process of law to a conviction based upon perjured testimony; Balzac
v. Puerto Rico,22 considering application of the Bill of Bights to "un-
incorporated territories;" Barenblatt v. United States2 3 and Uphaus
v. Wyman,24 enunciating a "balance between individual and govern-
mental interests" in the areas of Congressional and state investigations;
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market,25 relating to Sunday closing laws;
and Gibson v. Florida Investigating Committee,26 treating the rights
of a state to compel testimony as to whether alleged Communists
were members of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.
One might also mention in this connection: Henderson v. United
States,27 invalidating the segregation of Negroes in railroad dining
cars; Hirabayashi v. United States,28 upholding a wartime curfew as a
military measure to prevent espionage and sabotage; McCabe v. Atchi-
son Topeka & Sante Fe Railroad Company,29 denying the validity of
a state law allowing railroads to provide sleeping, dining, and chair
cars for whites only; Ex parte Merryman,30 dealing with the power
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 31
16 ScmwARnz, Vol. II at 464 n.103.
17 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
18 ScmxvARz, Vol. II at 792. Comp~are the brief, but informative, discussion
in a basic national government textbook: R. CARR, Am~rcANr D~wocRAcY 159(5th ed. 1968). See also the analysis of this and related "white primary" issues
in V. KEY, JR., Sourmi'R, Pozirrcs IN STATE AND NATION 621-624 (1950).
19 ScnvARTz, Vol. II at 979.
20 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
21355 U.S. 28 (1957).
22 258 U.S. 298 (1951).
23 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
24 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
25366 U.S. 617 (1961).26 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
27 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
28320 U.S. 81 (1943).
29235 U.S. 151 (1914).
30 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
31319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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indicating that "religious speech and press" enjoy a protection against
restraint and regulation which may be denied to "secular or com-
mercial speech or press;" Norris v. Alabama (the Second Scottsboro
Case),32 dealing with the exclusion of Negroes from jury rolls;
Schnell v. Davis,3 3 invalidating the "understanding" and "explanation
requirements" of Alabama's literacy test; and Williams v. Mississippi,34
holding that literacy tests, in and of themselves, do not violate the
fifteenth amendment since they do not deny anyone the right to vote
on the basis of race or color.
The above list of cases omitted is not meant to be exhaustive;
others might be mentioned. But it suggests significant oversights. One
might validly choose to exclude various of these cases, but can one
legitimately omit all of them?
Ultimately, perhaps, the major objection to Rights of Person is one
common to all such commentaries. An exposition of the "principles of
the Constitution" can never substitute for reading the cases. Through
time consumming inefficient, and excessively demanding of one's time,
the case method conveys understandings, insights, and intuitions un-
available in even the finest summary (and Schwartz's is one of the
finest).
Yet, one who would understand the implications of Baker v. Cart35
must read it-and Colegrove v. Green,36 Gray v. Sanders,31 Wesberry
v. Sanders,38 Reynolds v. Sims,39 Lucas v. General Assembly of Colo-
rado,40 and the other related cases. And he must read not merely the
"opinion of the Court," but the concurring and dissenting opinions,
where these exist. Schwartz's summary of Baker v. Carr, though more
extensive than those of most other cases, conveys, at best, an imperfect
understanding of even this great constitutional landmark. 41 And this
is even more true of lesser cases dealt with in a paragraph, a sentence,
or a phrase.
The most that a treatise like Schwartz's can do is to suggest where
one may best begin his research. If it does this comprehensively and
32 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
33336 U.S. 933 (1950).
34 170 U.S. 213 1889).
35 369 U.S. 186 1962).36 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
37 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
38376 U.S. 1 (1964).
39 377 U.S. 533 (1946).
40377 U.S. 713 (1964).
41 See Sc,mvArz, Vol. II at 551 ff. Compare, for example, Schwartz's state-
ment of the "hvo principal issues . ..presented for decision" in Baker v. Carr
with the three issues-jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability-that the United
States Supreme Court chose to decide.
[Vol. 57,
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TR WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
REFORM. By Archibald Cox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968. Pp. 144. $4.50
Archibald Cox begins this brief and incisive study of the Warren
Court by recalling that "de Tocqueville wrote more than a century
ago that hardly a political issue arose in the United States that was not
converted into a legal question and taken to the courts for decision."1
So it was then and so it is today. Americans, unlike any other people,
are in the peculiar habit of committing their most critical social,
economic, political, and philosophical questions to legal actions so
that the judiciary may participate in their resolution. Over the decades,
the judiciary has helped resolve these critical issues, while storms
have arisen in the American polity over the direction in which the
judiciary has led. Lawyers and political scientists, as well as members
of the Supreme Court itself, have joined in the fray to attempt to
answer the question: What is the proper role of the Supreme Court in
the American governmental and political system? Should the Justices
ignore the political aspects of their task-the public consequences of
their decisions? Should they ask themselves the question "What sub-
stantive result is best for the country?" Or should they be content to
answer the question "What is the decision according to law?" Dif-
ferent Courts have leaned in different directions, and the dilemma re-
mains.
This book is an attempt by a former Solicitor General of the
United States (1961-1965), who is presently a professor at Harvard
Law School, to show that the Supreme Court under the Chief
Justiceship of Earl Warren has met the dilemma head on and solved it
in an acceptable manner. Professor Cox admits that his view may be
prejudiced. One who sits in the Supreme Court almost daily awaiting
oral argument or the delivery of opinions, he tells us,
... Ealcquires both admiration and affection for the Court and for all the
justices. The problems with which they deal are so difficult, the number
1 A. Cox, THE WAammN COURT: CONSTITUTONAL DEcIsIoN AS AN INSTRU-
M.NT oF Emonm 1 (1968).
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